Materialism and a Consequence
EDITOR'S NOTE:
The author of this article wrote this some time ago, and now
refers to it as his "overly pedantic essay."
Presently, he feels as if his main thesis is encumbered rather than
strengthened by the mathematical notation. We nevertheless find
the original presentation intriguing, trust that the reader will read
for the thrust of the argument rather than for the perspicuity of its
presentation.]
Materialism
and a Consequence
-by Eric Matthew Vestrup
I doubt that I am the very first person to think of this, in fact I
know I am not. There is a consequence of materialism that is rather
disturbing when materialism is carried to its logical conclusion, or so
I myself get to it. By materialism I mean the worldview that says that
the universe is a closed system, everything being expressed and
explainable by the fixed laws of physics and the positioning of
particles . This somewhat abstract wording is actually how many people
view "life" in the functional sense, even though they may
confess various creeds. For example, those who claim that the universe
is "all that is" often fall into materialism. The following is
somewhat graphic, but it is deliberate to underscore what I believe is
the force of my conclusion. I will attempt to argue that IF materialism
is a true worldview, THEN you have no right to tell Mr. X that he cannot
kill Mr. Y when Mr. X desires to do so. From this startling conclusion,
I will further attempt to deduce that no system of ethics is justifiable
under the materialism hypothesis. In essence, "good" and
"evil" become arbitrary terms that have no intrinsic meaning.
It is important to observe that if my deductions are in fact logical
and true, then these most unsettling and unpleasant deductions cannot be
used as an argument against materialism. Materialism must be handled by
the metaphysician, and it is a logical fallacy to argue that an
unpleasant consequence mitigates against metaphysical truth. All I want
to do is see what happens IF materialism is true.
My background should be acknowledged with the hope that it doesn't
enter into the argumentation. I personally consider materialism to be
false, that is, I don't [for various logical reasons] consider the
universe a closed system with everything reducible to matter. I am in
fact an active theist, in particular, a Christian theist, who sees
precedent for the intervention into our space-time by a being external
to the universe but who can interact in our space-time. If materialism
is true, then my worldview is false. On the other hand, if Christian
theism is proven true, then materialism is false. This essay is not
about the validity of either of Christian theism or materialism over the
other, but is merely an exercise in following one pattern of thought to
a logical conclusion.
Now for the argument itself. I shall give a series of propositions
which will build a chain to the conclusion. I henceforth assume that
materialism is true.
1. The location of a particle in space-time has no intrinsic
"good" or "evil". I consider this axiomatic. The
fact that a given hydrogen atom has spatial coordinate A instead of some
other spatial coordinate B cannot lead to a value judgment of good or
bad. This holds true for each of the elements.
2. The location of any set of particles has no intrinsic
"good" or "evil". It seems reasonable by 1 that if a
single particle's location in space-time has no intrinsic ethical value,
then the same can be said for any set of particles.
3. Every event in space-time can be regarded as composed of (a) an
interval of time T, (b) a set of particles P, (c) and a set of states of
the particles S, and (d) a set of spatial coordinates C. We could
decompose each of T, P, C, and S into smaller pieces, but I don't think
that will help [or hinder!] the argument. To check point 3, let us ask
when two events are the same: they need to refer to the same time
intervals, the same set of particles, the same set of states, and the
two events have to happen in the exact same spatial coordinates. Put
another way, if you and I are thinking of two distinct events, then we
differ in at least one of the following: time interval of the event, the
particles given in the event, the set of states of those particles, or
the spatial coordinates in which the various states of the particles
were manifested. We can thus represent an arbitrary event E in space
time as an ordered quadruple (T,P,S,C).
4. It is meaningless to apply ethical judgments to sets of numbers.
This again I hope is near-axiomatic. It seems impossible for the set
consisting of the odd integers to be "better" or
"worse" than a set consisting of the rational numbers less
than 16.2431.
5. Each of the elements in the ordered quadruple (T,P,S,C)
representing any event E are sets of numbers. We can clearly demark the
duration of the event as an interval of real numbers. If we label all of
the particles in the universe's "life" p(1), p(2), p(3), and
so on, with the list being possibly countably infinite, then we could
use the notation {1,612,15660} to mean that particles p(1), p(612), and
p(15660) are the three particles making the event possible. Thus, we can
equivalently describe the particles in an event by a set of numbers,
possibly countably infinite. The set of states is not as
straightforward, but that too can be reduced to sets of ordered
n-tuples. We can define a one-to-one relation from the collection of
sets of ordered n-tuples to a collection of sets of the positive
integers, ultimately identifying each possible state set S with a set of
numbers. We can do the same with C. Thus ultimately, 5 follows.
6. No two events are ethically comparable. Let E(1) and E(2) denote
two events described as (T(1),P(1),S(1),C(1)) and (T(2),P(2),S(1),C(1)),
respectively. By point 4, it is meaningless to rank T(1) with T(2), P(1)
with P(2), S(1) with S(2), and C(1) with C(2), for each of these objects
is a set of numbers. Since individual components of E(1) and E(2) are
not comparable in terms of "better" or "worse", then
it follows that E(1) and E(2) have no comparability in terms of
"better" or "worse". But the two events were
arbitrary.
7. There is nothing "good" nor "bad" about Mr. X
killing Mr. Y. This follows from the fact that we take the event E(1) to
be Mr. X's terminating of Mr. Y. Given any other event E(2), E(1) and
E(2) are incomparable. That is, even if E(2) was the event "Mr. X
saves a drowning baby", it would follow from the previous
propositions that we cannot infer "E(2) is better than E(1)".
Epilogue to the Above. If my argument is in fact valid, I am most
thankful that conspicuous materialists or those who functionally live
and think as materialists don't follow the consequences to their
conclusion. The proof says nothing about whether materialists can be
good or bad in the eyes of "the public", say, and it does not
say that materialism is good nor bad. It merely says that a materialist
is acting arbitrarily when they say that "You should do X" or
"Don't do Y!". Thus, there is no intrinsically justifiable
basis for what we call morality. If there is not an intrinsically
justifiable basis for what we call morality, then any system of morality
will be arbitrary.
Social Consequences. 1. Homosexuality. Materialists are acting
consistently with their worldview when they announce that Christians who
consider homosexuality intrinsically wrong are in error, for any
homosexual activity may be represented as an event E with the structure
given above. Materialists are acting consistently when they decry any
system of ethics that claims anything more than utilitarian
justification with respect to somebody's measure of utility. Were the
materialist paradigm followed to its conclusion, I myself do not know
what such consequences [if indeed my argument is valid] would do to the
future records of human history.
Social Consequences. 2. Abortion. Materialists are consistent with
their worldview when they refuse to pass any ethical judgment on the
abortion question. Materialists are not consistent when they take a
position either way, for then some intrinsic value judgment is being
made by the materialist, which contradicts the above argument.
Social Consequences. 3. Hitler Was Justified[1]. Again, Hitler's actions
can be viewed as an event E with the structure as above. No value judgment
can be attached to E.
Social Consequences. 4. No Expression of Man Worthwhile Outside of
Artificial Considerations. My composing a piece of music is an event E,
a painter painting a sunset can be represented as an event E. These have
no intrinsic value whatever.
Conclusion. Ultimately, it seems, materialism leads to a human
existence that is utterly meaningless, apart from the arbitrary values
we place on it. This does not mean that materialists cannot be happy.
They can certainly be happy in an artificial or utilitarian sense. But
their happiness can never be based on anything that is not arbitrary. In
essence, the existence of the materialist is neither a good thing, nor a
bad thing. The existence of the materialism is itself an event E, and
thus devoid of meaning. Ultimately, it seems that nihilism is the
ultimate end product of materialism .
Does the Christian Theist Have It Any Better? This is a question
which the honest student must ask. In other words, if Christian theism
is true, then does our existence have any non-arbitrary meaning? Do we
have a justification for saying something is "objectively
right" or "objectively wrong" merely because "God
says so"? This shall be a topic for further study.
[1]
Editor's note: In later discussions concerning this essay, the author
clarified that 'justified' is a potentially confusing term here; it would be
more accurate to say that any moral statement attached to Hitler's
actions is logically meaningless if materialism is adopted, and thus
that moral condemnation of Hitler is inconsistent with materialism.